It is sometimes claimed that contractarism does not support the moral consideration of animals. But there are reasons to conclude that this is the case and that he may prescribe antispeciesism, veganism and support for wild animals. The first moral clause for a professional athlete could be a contract amendment dated November 11, 1922 for Babe Ruth. The clause states: Some points of contention between the contractors concern the role of the initial situation in theory: should it be considered as a real historical situation, as a possible historical moment, or is the contractual situation completely hypothetical? David Hume (1987/1777, 470-1) was the first to raise the decisive objection to any normative moral or political theory based on a historical contract: the consent of one`s ancestors does not bind anyone. Contemporary political philosophers have expressed similar concerns about a hypothetical treatise: to the extent that the agreement is hypothetical, it cannot be said to constitute an agreement (Dworkin 1975). In response to such objections, some contractors defend the hypothetical contract on heuristic grounds, insisting that the purpose of the contractual instrument is not to bind the contractors directly, but to provide a kind of thought experiment to uncover the requirements of practical rationality (Gauthier 1986, chap. VII). That is, they argue that if one is rational, and in other rational circumstances where an agreement is both possible and beneficial, then rationality requires that one adhere to the terms of the contract. While traditional contract theories are hypothetical contract theories, an interesting and highly subversive use of contractarism (Mills, 1997; Pateman, 1989; Pateman & Mills 2007 – see section on the subversion of contractarianism below) reads the status of the treaty as historic agreements aimed at establishing and maintaining white supremacy and patriarchy or male domination. These latter contractorial theories are, of course, not justifications for the status quo, but explanations and condemnations, and therefore do not meet with Hume`s objection.
Other questions that separate contemporary contractarians are: What are the ideal conditions and who are the ideal entrepreneurs who make the results of the contract binding on real individuals? What is the content of the hypothetical agreement? The social contract has two fundamental elements: a characterization of the initial situation, which modern political philosophers variously call “the state of nature,” Rawls` “original position” (1971, 17-22, 118-193) or Gauthier`s “initial negotiating position” (1986, 14-16, 131-134, passim) and a characterization of the contracting parties. especially in terms of rationality and motivation to reach an agreement. The initial situation postulates what is called the “no-deal position” in negotiation theory, the situation to which individuals return if they do not enter into an agreement or contract. This situation can be more or less hostile and more or less social, depending on how the theorist characterizes human life in the absence of rules of morality or justice. But what is crucial for all theories of contraction is that in the initial situation there is some scarcity or motivation for competition and there is some potential for profits from social interaction and cooperation. Rawls argued that those who were in the “original position” (Rawls` term for the starting point) should be placed behind a “veil of ignorance” that deprives them of any knowledge of what their own position in society will be. This means that they could be born, for example, into a poor family or a rich family, and not knowing would ensure impartiality.5 Rawls invites us to imagine a situation in which we must choose the norms of a hypothetical new society in which we will live, while completely ignoring all the facts about it, what place we will occupy in this society. as well as our physical constitution, our ethnicity and so on. Since people do not know their position in society in advance, they have selfish reasons to choose moral principles that benefit everyone.
Hampton also opposes the contemporary contractual assumption that interaction has only instrumental value. It argues that if interaction were useful only for the fruits of the collaboration it brings to selfish cooperation partners, it would be unlikely that those cooperation partners would be able to successfully resolve the compliance problem. In short, they are unlikely to be able to motivate morality in themselves without a natural inclination toward morality. Interestingly, Hampton agrees with Gauthier that contractarianism has the right to demand moral or political norms to appeal to the individual`s self-interest as a limitation on an individual`s sacrifice or exploitation. Such a view therefore raises the objection that there is a need for rehabilitation or accommodation that goes beyond a possible expected future contribution to a given person with a disability. And people with disabilities are not well placed to bear a danger of destabilizing society, so the motivation to enter into contracts with them must be the expected benefit. Relying solely on ideas of mutual benefit and reciprocity would continue to leave these people – the “outliers” – out of contract and languish under an acceptable level of function that they could legitimately claim in the face of a different moral theory. .